Blurred Blueprint For Myanmar Regime ReformJunta’s ‘reform moves’ likely only intended to prop up government
By: David Scott Mathieson
After years of promising some semblance of reform, Myanmar’s military regime has taken contorted steps to reconstitute its violent rule, dissolving the State Administration Council – a junta by any other name – and formally ending the six-month State of Emergency declared on the day of the February 1, 2021 coup d’etat, and extended for four years. The moves are likely to have little or no effect on the rebel groups and ethnic armies fighting to overthrow the regime, which are estimated to control about 40 percent of the country, with only about a quarter in the hands of the junta and the rest contested. Internationally, the reshuffle met with a lackluster response. However, the changes and a planned election are regarded as a way for the military to consolidate power rather than as a genuine move towards democracy. In place of the State Administration Council, the junta formed the State Security and Peace Commission (presumably the SSPC), with dictator Senior General Min Aung Hlaing appointed as “Pro-Tem President (On Duty)” along with nine other members. Mostly the same ministers were picked to form a new cabinet. In a more normal economy, there would be no time for an election. GDP is expected to shrink by 2.5 percent in the 2025-26 fiscal year, largely from the dual impact of the continuing civil conflict and economic mismanagement by the administration. Rampant inflation is averaging 27.5 percent annually, with nearly 77 percent of households classified as poor or near-poor, up from 58 percent in 2017 from the combined effects of the Covid-19 pandemic and the 2021 coup. Nonetheless, in a meandering speech marking the shapeshifting from one regime to the next, Min Aung Hlaing claimed “(w)e have already passed the first chapter. Now, we are starting the second chapter.” He went on to employ a Trump-like figure of speech. “If at the start of this second chapter we write it well, beautifully, and sincerely with our own hands and carry it out successfully, I believe we will overcome even more challenges, and the results of our efforts will be even more rewarding.” All of these changes were overseen by the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC) which bestows a constitutional patina of legality over what is simply a reshuffle and renaming exercise. Already, the council has released its Four Objectives to be plastered over state propaganda, the first of which promises a “genuine, disciplined multi-party democratic system” for the country. The headline in the state media the following day said it all. “Confirmed: Multiparty General Election Set for December.” There have been multiple signs that preparations for the election have accelerated. The Myanmar Electronic Voting Machine (MEVM) is being showcased in several urban areas around Myanmar. The junta leader often mentions the elections will combine two voting systems for input into the MEVM’s, both first past the post and ranked choice. Political party registration was previously announced to close on May 9, but the Union Electoral Commission (UEC) is still taking submissions. Something like 57 parties have already been registered, although mostly to run in limited areas. A limited number will field candidates nationwide. It is widely expected that where voting takes place, it will likely be in several stages over December and January. Where polls can practically take place is still highly uncertain in terms of election infrastructure and security. The civil war is raging in over half the country. And soon after the state of emergency was lifted on Thursday, martial law was declared in 63 of 330 townships, mostly in ongoing fighting areas. For the moribund regime standards at least, the past week has been a flurry of activity. On July 29, the SAC issued amendments to 26 sections of the national Lower House (Pyithu Hluttaw) Election Law, and 33 sections of the Upper House (Amyotha Hluttaw) Election Law. The state and regional Election Law received 32 amendments. How much of this is activity without meaning, tinkering without any more purpose than heaping on punitive provisions to an already draconian canon of law? More worryingly, on the same day, the regime issued a Law on Protection of Multiparty Democratic General Elections from Obstruction, Disruption, and Destruction (SAC Law No.48/2025) which lays out punishment for anyone found guilty of harassing anyone involved in the election process. The minimum sentence for threats or harassment is three years. Anyone found guilty of killing any individual involved in the elections, presumably poll workers, party candidates, or party officials, faces the death penalty. There is every possibility for widespread electoral-related violence by all sides. Global reactions China has been working behind the scenes, cultivating relations with several Myanmar political parties, and will support the elections as a way to stabilize the disorder that has derailed its economic infrastructure plans. India has already signaled its support and may send observers. The SAC and UEC have already asked for observers to be dispatched from Cambodia and Belarus also, which should give some indication of how democratic these polls are likely to be. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will be divided but grudgingly accept the inevitability of elections. Tokyo’s response was cautionary. “Japan is seriously concerned that if general elections are held without seeing any moves toward political progress…it could only provoke further strong backlash from the people of Myanmar and make a peaceful resolution more difficult.” It’s highly unlikely that any of these fevered reshufflings will result in anything meaningful. Comparisons to previous periods, such as the lead-up to the 2010 elections, are laughably spurious, and being whispered around by Western diplomats in Yangon with no historical context and an impulse to see some sort of breakout out of the stasis of the past four years. The danger of these recent announcements is that some domestic and foreign observers could see some insincere but practical levers for reform. This is misguided. These alterations are not an off-ramp for the regime. Two other elements must be considered. One is the violent incompetence of the Myanmar military. So many things can still go awry, especially in the conflict zones. There are already rumblings that some Ethnic Armed Organizations (EAOs) will contest the election through proxy parties. The second element is the resolve of many war-torn communities and insurgent groups to maintain resistance. Myanmar may be war weary, but four years of military mass murder won’t evaporate with an authoritarian makeover and a specious election. David Scott Mathieson is an independent analyst working on conflict, humanitarian, and human rights issues in Myanmar and a regular contributor to Asia Sentinel This is among the stories/excerpts we choose to make widely available.If you wish to get the full Asia Sentinel experience and access more exclusive content, please do subscribe to us for US$10/month or US$100/year.
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